Swedbank's Baltic branches moved suspect funds linked to the Danske scandal
Swedbank (Baltic money laundering) · Banking (listed)
The case in brief
Visible before detection
Checks that could have surfaced it, on hindsight
Regulatory & litigation records
Would have tracked regulators' warnings.
Can mislead when: Court records lag and name spellings vary. A clean record can mean the problem has not reached court yet.
Ownership / related-party links
Would have mapped beneficial owners of non-resident accounts.
Can mislead when: Nominee directors and offshore layers hide links. Name matching throws up false positives, so every flag shows its evidence path.
End-use tracing of funds
Would have traced flows through correspondent accounts.
Can mislead when: Kubr sees only the company's own accounts. Once money reaches a third party's bank, Kubr can flag the payee but cannot see the next hop without that party's consent.
Where Kubr services would have helped
Borrower monitor
Offered in India- C3 Would have mapped beneficial owners of non-resident accounts.
- C6 Would have traced flows through correspondent accounts.
- C8 Would have tracked regulators' warnings.
Verified Snapshot
Offered in India- C3 Would have mapped beneficial owners of non-resident accounts.
- C8 Would have tracked regulators' warnings.
Legal diligence support
Offered in India- C3 Would have mapped beneficial owners of non-resident accounts.
- C8 Would have tracked regulators' warnings.
Promoter profiles
Offered in India- C3 Would have mapped beneficial owners of non-resident accounts.
- C8 Would have tracked regulators' warnings.
Mapped from the checks each service runs. A hindsight reading of public records, not a promise that the failure would have been found.
Same pattern
A summary of public documents. It reports what the sources say. It is not Kubr's finding and not a statement of guilt.