Lime fund figure jailed 30 years for embezzling KRW 130 billion
Lime Asset Management · Asset management (hedge funds)
The case in brief
Visible before detection
Checks that could have surfaced it, on hindsight
Ownership / related-party links
Would have mapped fund holdings to entities controlled by the manager.
Can mislead when: Nominee directors and offshore layers hide links. Name matching throws up false positives, so every flag shows its evidence path.
End-use tracing of funds
Would have traced fund proceeds to their final use.
Can mislead when: Kubr sees only the company's own accounts. Once money reaches a third party's bank, Kubr can flag the payee but cannot see the next hop without that party's consent.
Third-party confirmation
Would have confirmed holdings with custodians and investee companies.
Can mislead when: Counterparties can collude or ignore requests. A non-response is logged as a gap, never as a pass.
Where Kubr services would have helped
Borrower monitor
Offered in India- C3 Would have mapped fund holdings to entities controlled by the manager.
- C6 Would have traced fund proceeds to their final use.
Proceeds tracer
Offered in India- C3 Would have mapped fund holdings to entities controlled by the manager.
- C6 Would have traced fund proceeds to their final use.
Verified Snapshot
Offered in India- C3 Would have mapped fund holdings to entities controlled by the manager.
Financial diligence
Offered in India- C3 Would have mapped fund holdings to entities controlled by the manager.
Mapped from the checks each service runs. A hindsight reading of public records, not a promise that the failure would have been found.
Same pattern
A summary of public documents. It reports what the sources say. It is not Kubr's finding and not a statement of guilt.