Ezubao raised 50 billion yuan from 900,000 investors for loans that were mostly fake
Ezubao · Peer-to-peer lending (private)
The case in brief
Visible before detection
Checks that could have surfaced it, on hindsight
Counterparty existence
Would have checked whether borrowers existed.
Can mislead when: Real companies can be used as pass-throughs. Existence does not prove a real trade, so C6 and C7 still apply.
End-use tracing of funds
Would have traced investor money to loans.
Can mislead when: Kubr sees only the company's own accounts. Once money reaches a third party's bank, Kubr can flag the payee but cannot see the next hop without that party's consent.
Regulatory & litigation records
Would have found regulatory complaints.
Can mislead when: Court records lag and name spellings vary. A clean record can mean the problem has not reached court yet.
Where Kubr services would have helped
Verified Snapshot
Offered in India- C4 Would have checked whether borrowers existed.
- C8 Would have found regulatory complaints.
Valuation context
Offered in India- C4 Would have checked whether borrowers existed.
- C8 Would have found regulatory complaints.
Borrower monitor
Offered in India- C6 Would have traced investor money to loans.
- C8 Would have found regulatory complaints.
Proceeds tracer
Offered in India- C4 Would have checked whether borrowers existed.
- C6 Would have traced investor money to loans.
Mapped from the checks each service runs. A hindsight reading of public records, not a promise that the failure would have been found.
Same pattern
A summary of public documents. It reports what the sources say. It is not Kubr's finding and not a statement of guilt.