EOH won government tenders through a 'corruption infested' bidding process
EOH Group (now iOCO) · IT services (listed)
The case in brief
Visible before detection
Checks that could have surfaced it, on hindsight
End-use tracing of funds
Would have traced payments to intermediaries.
Can mislead when: Kubr sees only the company's own accounts. Once money reaches a third party's bank, Kubr can flag the payee but cannot see the next hop without that party's consent.
Operating-metric verification
Would have tested delivery against contract billing.
Can mislead when: Contract staff do not appear in EPFO. Vahan access needs licensed APIs. Some businesses have no physical trace.
Regulatory & litigation records
Would have tracked procurement investigations.
Can mislead when: Court records lag and name spellings vary. A clean record can mean the problem has not reached court yet.
Where Kubr services would have helped
Portfolio monitor
Offered in India- C8 Would have tracked procurement investigations.
- C10 Would have tested delivery against contract billing.
Borrower monitor
Offered in India- C6 Would have traced payments to intermediaries.
- C8 Would have tracked procurement investigations.
Proceeds tracer
Offered in India- C6 Would have traced payments to intermediaries.
- C10 Would have tested delivery against contract billing.
Verified Snapshot
Offered in India- C8 Would have tracked procurement investigations.
Mapped from the checks each service runs. A hindsight reading of public records, not a promise that the failure would have been found.
Same pattern
A summary of public documents. It reports what the sources say. It is not Kubr's finding and not a statement of guilt.