A New York lawyer sold $700 million of fake promissory notes using impersonation
Dreier LLP (Marc Dreier) · Law firm (private)
The case in brief
Visible before detection
Checks that could have surfaced it, on hindsight
Third-party confirmation
Would have confirmed the notes directly with the named issuer.
Can mislead when: Counterparties can collude or ignore requests. A non-response is logged as a gap, never as a pass.
Document authenticity / direct pull
Would have verified the identity of people confirming the deal.
Can mislead when: The company can refuse consent, and a refusal is itself a flag. Some banks and co-op banks are not on AA yet.
Counterparty existence
Would have checked the issuer's real borrowing.
Can mislead when: Real companies can be used as pass-throughs. Existence does not prove a real trade, so C6 and C7 still apply.
Where Kubr services would have helped
Financial diligence
Offered in India- C4 Would have checked the issuer's real borrowing.
- C5 Would have verified the identity of people confirming the deal.
Verified Snapshot
Offered in India- C4 Would have checked the issuer's real borrowing.
IC note
Offered in India- C5 Would have verified the identity of people confirming the deal.
Valuation context
Offered in India- C4 Would have checked the issuer's real borrowing.
Mapped from the checks each service runs. A hindsight reading of public records, not a promise that the failure would have been found.
Same pattern
A summary of public documents. It reports what the sources say. It is not Kubr's finding and not a statement of guilt.